The Kyoto Protocol assigns limits for the aggregate emissions of six greenhouse gases, but most economic analyses focus on CO 2 abatement. What are the potential gains if policy makers exploit the flexibility in a multi-gas abatement strategy? We extend the EDGE model to include sinks and non-CO 2 gases and show that a multigas strategy reduces costs by 20-35% in the Western Annex B countries. Marginal abatement costs decrease around 30%, and the cost-effective abatement mix involves relatively more abatement of the non-CO 2 gases, which offers many low costs abatement options.
Lower marginal abatement costs decrease domestic action by reducing the costs of emissions imports, whereas more low cost abatement options increases domestic action. The low cost abatement options increase domestic action, whereas lower marginal abatement costs reduces domestic action by making imports of emissions cheaper. The net effect of a multi-gas strategy on domestic action is therefore not given a priori. We show that a multi-gas strategy reduces domestic action around 2% in the United States and increases domestic action by around 8% in the European Union. Our sensitivity analyses finally show that the relatively weak growth in non-CO 2 baseline emissions accounts for a large share of the savings associated with a multi-gas strategy.
Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol assigns emissions limits to all countries listed in Annex B to the protocol. The limits apply to the aggregate emissions of six greenhouse gases and this give each country the flexibility to individually control the emissions of each gas. Most of the existing economic analyses of the Kyoto Protocol focus exclusively on controlling the most important gas, CO 2 , but our analysis shows that a multi-gas control strategy may lower costs significantly.
Specifically, most of the existing analyses ignore the effects of abatement of the five non-CO 2 greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol: CH 4 , N 2 O, HFCs, PFCs and SF 6 .
1 This naturally raises the question: What are the effects on costs and abatement if policy makers exploit the multi-gas flexibility in the Kyoto protocol?
We address this question by extending the EDGE model (Jensen et al. [2000a] ) to include emissions data and abatement options for the five non-CO 2 gases. We assume unlimited trading among all Annex B countries with emissions of all six gases and our results focus on some of the key concerns to policy makers when designing climate policies: Marginal costs, welfare costs, domestic action, and the abatement mix of the six gases.
Our preliminary results suggest that a multi-gas strategy reduces costs significantly. Marginal abatement costs decrease around 30%, when replacing a strategy of controlling CO 2 only with a multi-gas strategy. Welfare costs in the Western Annex B countries decrease 20-35%, whereas the countries in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe experience a loss in welfare of almost 40% due to lower revenues from emissions exports.
In most regions, non-CO 2 emissions account for less than 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, but the non-CO 2 emissions offer many low cost abatement options. The non-CO 2 gases therefore account for a relatively larger share in a costeffective abatement mix.
We also analyse the consequences for domestic action, which we define as the share of domestic abatement divided by total abatement, where the latter equals the difference between the (hypothetic) baseline emissions and the Kyoto commitment. More low cost abatement options tend to increase domestic action, whereas lower marginal abatement costs reduces domestic action by making imports of emissions cheaper. The net effect of a multi-gas strategy on domestic action is therefore not given a priori. Our results show that domestic action increases slightly in all Western Annex B regions, except in the United States where domestic action decreases as higher imports of emissions dominate the effects of domestic non-CO 2 abatement.
Our results are generally consistent with the few existing analyses of multi-gas abatement. Burniaux [2000] and Manne and Richels [2000] extend the GREEN and the MERGE models, respectively, to cover CO 2 , CH 4 and N 2 O, but both models ignore the other three gases. Their analyses apply different aggregate emissions targets when comparing the multi-gas strategy with the strategy of controlling CO 2 only; that is, the two strategies do not imply the same environmental improvement. Reilly et al. [1999] extend the MIT-EPPA model to include CO 2 sinks and all six greenhouse gases. Their analyses apply identical emissions targets, which make their results comparable to ours, but they do not analyse the potential gains from international trade with emissions in the case of multi-gas abatement.
We extend this literature in several respects. First, our comparison of a multi-gas strategy with a single-gas (CO 2 ) strategy applies identical emissions targets and assumes unlimited emissions trading among the Annex B countries. Second, we review the literature on the costs of abating the five non-CO 2 gases and estimate continuous marginal abatement cost curves for use in the analyses. Third, we include sensitivity analyses of some of the key assumptions regarding non-CO 2 abatement. These analyses have been motivated by some of the uncertainties surrounding the limited data on non-CO 2 emissions, and similar analyses are only available in Reilly et al. [1999] . Finally, our results include the effects on domestic action, which have not been reported by any of the existing analyses.
The next section gives an overview of sinks and abatement of non-CO 2 gases, and this provides the background for our analysis of a multi-gas control strategy. Section 3 then introduces the EDGE model and outlines the extensions necessary for multigas analysis. Section 4 defines the policy scenarios and section 5 discusses the numerical results. Section 6 presents the sensitivity analyses and the last section summarizes the main findings and discusses natural extensions of the analysis.
Economic analysis of multi-gas abatement and sinks
Most of the existing economic analyses of the Kyoto Protocol focus exclusively on abatement of energy related CO 2 emissions. This has been a natural first step given the wide availability of energy data and the long experience with energy modelling, for example for planning purposes. Furthermore, this approach covers the quantitatively most important of the six greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol (illustrated in Figure 1 ).
The following sections present the first steps towards incorporating sinks and non-CO 2 emissions. Specifically, we provide an overview of the main sources of emissions of non-CO 2 gases, the abatement requirements, and the most important abatement options. We also discuss issues related to CO 2 sinks, including the modelling challenges the sinks involve. 
CO2
Emissions of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases
The greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol are listed in Table 1 along with the main sources of emissions. The agricultural sector accounts for many of the emissions of CH 4 and N 2 O, but waste (for example landfills) and energy supply (for example coal mining) also contribute significantly. HFCs, PFCs and SF 6 are also known both as the industrial greenhouse gases because of their origin, and as the HGWP gases because of their high global warming potentials. The gases have different impacts on the climate as well as different lifetimes in the atmosphere, and they are therefore not directly comparable on a tonne-for-tonne basis. Since the limits for emissions in the Kyoto Protocol apply to aggregate emissions of the six greenhouse gases, we need a method to establish equivalency in terms of climate effects in order to compare reductions in emissions of the different gases.
We follow the Kyoto Protocol and use 100-years global warming potentials to convert all emissions into carbon equivalents (CE). This method supposedly establishes equivalency in terms of climate effects over a time horizon of 100 years, but it has been subject to a number of criticisms.
2 In particular, the choice of a 100 year horizon is arbitrary, as a shorter (longer) horizon would imply higher (lower) global warming potentials for the shorter lived gases (for example CH 4 ).
The quantitative importance of each gas varies by country, but in most countries CH 4 and N 2 O emissions account for most of the non-CO 2 emissions (Figure 2 ). The three industry gases, HFCs, PFCs, and SF 6 , currently have little importance, except in Japan, but their high global warming potentials imply that even small changes in emissions may have large climate effects. In most countries, economic growth is the key driver for CO 2 emissions. Expectations about future economic growth imply that energy outlooks typically expect CO 2 emissions in 2010 to exceed 1990 emissions by 10-30% in most Western Annex B countries (see Figure 3) . In several countries undergoing transition to a market economy, the Kyoto commitments are expected to exceed emissions in 2008-2012. This difference, also known as Hot Air, can then be traded with other Annex B countries along with other "real" emissions reductions. 
CH4
The international energy outlooks are typically based on global models of energy demand and supply.
3 This ensures some consistency in the outlooks across countries, for example with respect to international energy markets and methods for emissions accounting.
International outlooks with similar consistency are not available for non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions. We have therefore compiled a database with baseline non-CO 2 emissions based on the Annex B countries' individual communications to the UNFCCC. 4 The communications are not necessarily mutually consistent and in many cases, they furthermore include the anticipated effects of proposed policies. This makes it hard to identify a relevant baseline, i.e., the expected future emissions with no changes in current policies.
We therefore caution a too literal interpretation of the baseline emissions of non-CO 2 gases in Figure 3 . The weak growth in most of the non-CO 2 emissions are consistent with Burniaux [2000] , who also uses UNFCCC data to construct baseline emissions paths, but different from Reilly et al. [2000] , who report significant increases in most regions' emissions (also in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union).
5
Economic growth is one of the key drivers for the emissions increases in Reilly et al. [2000] . In our sensitivity analysis reported below, we adopt a similar assumption to illustrate the sensitivity with respect to the choice of baseline.
Abatement of emissions of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases
The key to lower emissions of CO 2 is reduced combustion of fossil fuels. In contrast, lower activity (use) is only one option with respect to emissions of non-CO 2 gases. For example, emissions of CH 4 from landfills can be combusted and provide energy, and the emissions of the HGWP industrial greenhouse gases can be recovered and recycled.
There typically exists a range of alternative abatement technologies for each source of non-CO 2 emissions, and a quickly growing literature analyses the potential emissions reductions and the associated costs and benefits. The studies typically summarize their results in a list, which shows estimates of costs for different levels of abatement. These estimates are effectively points on marginal abatement cost curves, which order the options for abating emissions from lowest cost to highest cost.
Using these points as inputs, we estimate continuous functional forms to incorporate the marginal abatement cost curves in the model. For CH 4 and HGWP, the functional form is where P is the marginal abatement costs in 95$/tCE, a, b, and Max are parameters and X is the percentage reduction in the country's emissions. Max can be interpreted as the maximum potential reduction. AEA EPA [1999] list data for CH 4 for the European Union and the United States, respectively, and the data for the HGWP is listed in Harnisch and Hendriks [2000] for the European Union and EPA [2000] for the United States.
For N 2 O, we use estimates from Burniaux [2000] based on 5 The baseline data reported in Manne and Richels [2000] do not make comparisons possible.
X Max
In this case, c and Max are parameters and P and X are as above. Table 2 summarizes the estimation results. All the studies of CH 4 and N 2 O abatement report "free" reductions, i.e., reductions with zero or negative costs. In the European Union, the "free" reductions amount to 40 MtCO 2 in 2010 or around 6% of total non-CO 2 emissions. In the United States, the corresponding figures are 139 MtCO 2 and 13%.
As noted above, the UNFCCC baselines often include the anticipated effects of proposed abatement policies. To minimize double counting of reductions, we therefore include the "free" reductions in the baseline in our policy analysis. This is an important assumption; the amount of "free" reductions is substantial and we illustrate the consequences in our sensitivity analysis reported below.
We have only found studies of the costs of non-CO 2 abatement for the European Union and the United States. We therefore make the simplifying assumption that all other regions have marginal abatement cost curves similar to the curves for the European Union. That is, the same percentage reduction in emissions has the same marginal costs in all Annex B countries, except the United States. shows that Japan and the European Union has the highest marginal abatement costs for CO 2 emissions, and that the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has the lowest.
We then used the marginal abatement costs for CO 2 to calculate reductions in non-CO 2 emissions using our estimated marginal abatement cost curves. Figure 4 summarizes the costs all non-CO 2 gases and the Figure shows that the non-CO 2 gases offer a significant amount low costs abatement options.
Figure 5 finally shows the marginal abatement costs curves for the individual non-CO 2 gases. CH 4 dominates the abatement opportunities in the regions including the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The HGWPs dominate in Japan, following the large share of HGWPs in total non-CO 2 emissions, and in the European Union, the three types of gases offer an equal amount of abatement options. Finally, the removal of CO 2 by most forestry activities occurs over long periods and therefore requires discounting of both net removals of CO 2 and net revenues. To illustrate, plantation of a periodically harvested forest involves a cycle of both removal of CO 2 through the growth of the trees, the forest floor and soil, and release of CO 2 through material decay, harvesting, processing and manufacturing. Furthermore, the economics of forest plantation also depend on the opportunity costs of growing agricultural products and the value of harvested trees in a distant future.
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As a first step towards incorporating sinks, we therefore only incorporate baseline CO 2 removals and emissions from land use change and forestry using the Annex B countries' communications to the UNFCCC. We ignore any additional sinks projects. 
The EDGE model
To analyse the economics of a multi-gas strategy towards the Kyoto commitments, we extend the EDGE model to incorporate removal of CO 2 via sinks and abatement of the five non-CO 2 gases. The model is an extension of Jensen et al. [2000a] , which analyses the consequences of ceilings on international trade with emissions rights.
In the following, we outline the extensions necessary for multi-gas analysis. We refer the interested reader to Jensen et al. [2000a] for a non-technical summary of the model, and Jensen et al. [2000b] for a technical summary of the model.
Modelling greenhouse gas abatement
Abatement of CO 2 emissions effectively reduces to lower use of fossil fuels. Specifically, abatement may happen in the model through the following types of substitution: between the individual fossil fuels, between fossil fuels and non-fossil goods and services, and between non-fossil goods and services.
We model CO 2 abatement via a scheme for tradable emissions rights. All combustion of fossil fuels requires emissions rights according to the embodied CO 2 in the fuel. The government in each region sets the emissions limit, and firms and households can trade emissions rights on a perfectly competitive market.
In addition to lower use, abatement of non-CO 2 emissions also include options to recover gases, for example use recovered CH 4 from landfills to provide energy, and options to recycle gases. Including non-CO 2 abatement also raises the issue of interaction between abatement of the different gases. For example, lower use of coal may not only reduce CO 2 emissions but also reduce CH 4 emissions via lower mining activity.
Following Reilly et al. [2000] we ignore the interaction effect and focus on options for lower use, recovery and recycling. This allows us to employ directly our estimated marginal abatement cost curves and let the emissions be tradable on the market for CO 2 emissions.
Scenarios
All our scenarios share a number of common features. First, all countries and regions in the model have cost-effective national emissions trading. No transactions costs apply to any trade with emissions, and all markets for emissions rights are perfectly competitive.
Second, the scenarios reach the Kyoto emissions limits and imply the same absolute reduction in carbon-equivalent emissions (the same climate change effect). In other words, the scenarios provide the same public good, and we can therefore compare the scenarios without evaluating the costs and benefits of climate change.
Third, all emissions rights in a given country, corresponding to the country's Kyoto commitment, are grandfathered to the representative agent. 7 We therefore ignore any revenue recycling effects, for example if the government auctions the emissions rights and uses the revenue to reduce distortionary labour income taxes. 8 Fourth, we assume Kyoto-forever. That is, the Kyoto commitments also apply in all commitment periods after 2012. This is important even if we are only interested in the results for 2008-2012, as the decisions of forward-looking agents in 2008-2012 also depend on the policies after 2012. The assumption is a convenient, but arbitrary point of departure, and we appreciate that the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will grow considerably under this assumption.
Fifth, we assume unlimited trade with emissions trading among the Annex B countries, including unlimited trade with hot air. We do not consider transfers of emissions via the Clean Development Mechanism.
Finally, we calibrate autonomous energy efficiency improvements and other technological changes to match the changes in baseline emissions and GDP. These changes are exogenous in the policy scenarios. 
Policy scenarios
We use acronyms to label the scenarios to facilitate the presentation of the results. The scenario SingleGas assumes control of CO 2 emissions only and no abatement of the non-CO 2 gases. This scenario corresponds to the least cost strategy across all sources of CO 2 emissions to reach the Kyoto emissions limits.
Policy makers can alternatively adopt a multi-gas strategy, which implies control of all emissions. We label this scenario MultiGas, and this scenario corresponds to the least cost strategy across all sources of emissions of all six greenhouse gases to reach the Kyoto emissions limits.
Both the scenarios SingleGas and MultiGas reach the same multi-gas target for aggregate carbon-equivalent emissions of all gases and both scenario include the same change in sinks. Figure 7 shows the percentage reduction requirements from the baseline emissions in 2010 necessary to reach the emissions limits in the Kyoto Protocol. Weak growth in baseline emissions implies a relatively low reduction requirement for the European Union. The emissions limits exceed the baseline emissions in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and this region therefore has excess emissions (Hot Air). 
Results
The next sections present the numerical results from the analysis of the scenarios in the EDGE model. In all scenarios, we report marginal abatement costs, welfare costs, domestic action, and we furthermore decompose domestic action into CO 2 and non-CO 2 abatement. All economic results are reported in €2000. Our database is denominated in US$1995, and we assume that 1 US$1995 = 1.30 €1995, and that inflation implies that 1 €1995 = 1.11 €2000. Thus, 1 US$1995 = 1.44 €2000.
Economic results
The marginal abatement costs in Figure 8 summarizes the economic impacts of the scenarios. A multi-gas control strategy lowers costs from 21 €/tCO 2 to 14 €/tCO 2 (or around 30%) when compared with a single-gas (CO 2 ) control strategy. Intuitively, non-CO 2 emissions offer many low cost opportunities, which can replace some of the high cost CO 2 abatement options. The reduction in marginal abatement costs reduces the welfare costs of the Kyoto Protocol in all Western Annex B countries (see Figure 9 ). The reductions in costs vary between 20% and 35%. 
Environmental results
Abatement of CO 2 emissions will account for between 60% and 75% of the abatement in a multi-gas control strategy (see Figure 11) . The large share is intuitive given CO 2 's large share in total emissions. Nevertheless, in all regions, the share is smaller than the share of CO 2 emissions in total emissions as it is cost-effective to abate a relatively higher percentage of the non-CO 2 emissions. The distribution of the reductions in non-CO 2 emissions follows the marginal abatement cost curves in Figure 5 . That is, CH 4 , N 2 O, and the HGWP roughly account for one-third of total non-CO 2 abatement in the European Union, and in all other regions, except Japan, CH 4 , also account for the majority of the reductions.
Finally, we report results for domestic action. 10 A multi-gas strategy increases domestic action slightly in most regions; lower marginal abatement costs increases imports of emissions rights and therefore lower domestic action, but more low cost abatement options increase domestic action and dominate the effect of cheaper emissions imports (see Figure 12) . Domestic action decreases slightly in the United States, where the effects of cheaper emissions imports dominate. 
Sensitivity analysis
How sensitive are the results to the assumptions we have made to extend the EDGE model to include sinks and non-CO 2 emissions? We address this question by analysing a second set of scenarios, which partly has been motivated by some of the uncertainties surrounding the limited data on sinks and non-CO 2 emissions.
Scenarios
First, we define the scenario OnlyCO 2 , which assumes control of CO 2 emissions only and ignores both sinks and non-CO 2 emissions in setting the limits for emissions. This scenario shows the effects of all of the extensions of the model, and it also allows us to compare the EDGE model with most of the existing literature
The scenario Growth assumes that non-CO 2 emissions grow with the same percentage as CO 2 emissions in each region. This scenario illustrates the consequences of the generally optimistic baselines for future non-CO 2 emissions reported by the Annex B governments to the UNFCCC.
The scenario NoRegrets differs from the MultiGas scenario by including the "free" non-CO 2 abatement options in the analysis. That is, these options will be used as a response to the Kyoto requirements.
Finally, we define the scenario FixedSinks, which includes sinks in 1990 in setting the target (similar to the other scenarios) but ignores any subsequent removals or emissions of CO 2 from land use change and forestry. In other words, this scenario illustrates the importance of the changes in sinks embodied in the baselines. Table 3 summarizes the scenarios in terms of emissions and Figure 13 shows the corresponding reduction requirements. The scenarios MultiGas, SingleGas, and NoRegrets imply the same baseline emissions and reduction requirements by definition, as they only differ by the available abatement options. Table 3 also shows that the scenario OnlyCO 2 does not provide the same environmental improvement as the other scenarios as it ignores sinks and non-CO 2 emissions.
Two factors help explain the comparison with most of the existing literature (scenario MultiGas versus scenario OnlyCO 2 ). First, baseline emissions of non-CO 2 gases grow slower than CO 2 emissions in all regions, except in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. The effect is particularly strong in the European Union, where the exclusion of the five non-CO 2 emissions implies a strong increase in the percentage reduction requirement. Second, emissions from sinks in the United States and Japan dominate the baseline decrease in non-CO 2 emissions and the reduction requirements therefore increase in these regions.
Alternatively, if the expected decreases in baseline non-CO 2 emissions fail to materialize (as in the scenario Growth), the reduction requirements increase significantly in most Western regions. In particular, the reduction requirement in the European Union almost doubles if non-CO 2 emissions grow at the same yearly rate as CO 2 emissions. In addition, the amount of hot air in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union increases significantly. Finally, Figure 13 also shows that the increases in the reduction requirements in the scenario FixedSinks show that the changes in baseline sinks imply a net removal in the European Union, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and vice-versa for the other regions. 
Economic results
The scenario OnlyCO 2 implies marginal abatement costs of 28 €/tCO 2 or 71 $1995/tCE. (see Figure 14) . This compares well with the results of the multi-model evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol in Weyant [1999] . The median carbon tax for Annex B trading is around 70 $1990/tCE and five out the thirteen models included report carbon taxes in the range 50-80 $1990/tCE. 11 The scenario also suggests that the narrow focus on CO 2 , both with respect to abatement options and in setting the target, leads to a significant overestimate (almost 100%) of the costs of the of the Kyoto Protocol.
Comparing the same scenarios, Reilly et al. [1999] show narrow focus on CO 2 leads to an overestimate of the marginal abatement costs between 8% in Eastern Europe and 153% in some of the OECD countries. Assuming Annex B emissions trading and ignoring the HGWPs, Burniaux [2000] and Manne and Richels [2000] show that the marginal abatement costs increases by around 50% and 100%, respectively. The weak growth in the non-CO 2 baseline emissions, particularly in the European Union, reduces the reduction requirements significantly. If these baseline reductions fail to materialize and non-CO 2 emissions grow in line with CO 2 emissions, the scenario Growth shows that the marginal abatement costs increase almost 50%.
In contrast, marginal abatement costs decrease more than 25% if we include the "free" reductions in the analysis as part of the abatement options for new policies (scenario NoRegrets). Effectively, the "free" reductions shift the marginal abatement curves horizontally, and the same reduction requirements therefore imply lower costs.
Finally, the scenario FixedSinks illustrates the effects of eliminating the baseline changes in sinks. Specifically, all the previous scenarios, except the scenario OnlyCO 2 , included a total net removal of 110 MtCO 2 , or around 7% of the total emissions Annex B emissions reductions in 2010. In the scenario FixedSinks, we exclude this baseline effect and the marginal abatement costs therefore increases, as expected.
The changes in the marginal abatement costs and the reduction requirements help explain the changes in the welfare costs ( Figure 15 ). In all regions, a narrow focus on CO 2 (scenario OnlyCO 2 ) leads to an overestimate of the costs of the Kyoto Protocol. Stronger growth in the non-CO 2 baseline emissions increases the reduction requirements (scenario Growth). As expected, this increases the welfare costs in all regions. The Figure also shows that if non-CO 2 baseline emissions grow in line with CO 2 baseline emissions, then the costs of a multi-gas strategy may actually exceed the cost estimates focussing on CO 2 only (compare scenarios MultiGas and OnlyCO 2 ).
Our reference baseline for non-CO 2 emissions includes the effects of proposed policies, and we therefore include the "free" non-CO 2 abatement options in the baseline to minimize double counting of reductions. If we instead include the "free" reductions in the policy analysis (scenario NoRegrets), costs decrease in all regions as expected.
Finally, if sinks in 2010 equal sinks in 1990 (scenario FixedSinks), marginal abatement costs increases, but the reduction requirements decrease in all regions, except in the European Union. The changes in marginal abatement costs and in the reduction requirements unambiguously increase welfare costs in the European Union, but works in opposite directions in the other regions.
A multi-gas strategy reduces the gains to countries in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Figure 16 ). A narrow focus on CO 2 (scenario OnlyCO 2 ) increases both the marginal abatement costs and the revenues from emissions exports. Stronger growth in the non-CO 2 baseline emissions (scenario Growth) leads to similar effects: higher marginal abatement costs and higher revenues from emissions exports, and both effects improve welfare. The opposite happens if we instead include the "free" reductions in the policy analysis (scenario NoRegrets). Finally, the scenario FixedSinks implies a welfare loss, if the net removal emissions in the baseline do not materialize. Figure 17 shows that the CO 2 abatement share decreases in both the scenarios Growth and NoRegrets. Intuitively, both scenarios imply a larger abatement potential for non-CO 2 gases (because of higher baseline non-CO 2 emissions and "free" abatement options, respectively). The marginal abatement cost curves for non-CO 2 emissions are steeper than the curves for CO 2 emissions, and as the marginal abatement costs increases in the scenario FixedSinks, the share of CO 2 abatement increases. The narrow focus on CO 2 increases domestic action, except in the European Union (see scenario OnlyCO 2 in Figure 18 ). Three factors drive this share. First, more low cost domestic abatement options increase domestic action. Second, domestic action increases as the marginal abatement costs increases (imports of emissions become more expensive). Third, domestic action decreases with the reduction requirement. The effect of higher marginal abatement dominates in all regions, except in the European Union, where the reduction requirements inflates emissions imports so much, that domestic action decreases. Ellerman and Wing [2000] also analyse the scenario OnlyCO 2 . They report domestic action in the range 38% to 47% in all Western Annex B regions.
Environmental results
Stronger growth in the baseline non-CO 2 emissions (the scenario Growth) increases the abatement requirements and therefore the overall marginal abatement costs. The abatement requirement increases considerably in the European Union, and this reduces domestic action more than the increase following higher marginal abatement costs. In the other regions, the net effect is opposite: domestic action increases.
Marginal abatement costs decreases significantly, if we include the "free" reductions in the abatement options (the scenario NoRegrets). Most of the "free" reductions are available in the United States, which explains why domestic action increases in the United States. In the European Union and in Japan, the lower marginal abatement costs make imports of emissions rights more attractive, and domestic action therefore decreases.
Finally, the scenario FixedSinks illustrates the effects of the baseline changes in sinks: net removal in the European Union and emissions in the other regions.
Marginal abatement costs change little, so if sinks in 2010 equal sinks in 1990, domestic action decreases in the European Union, but increases elsewhere. 
Concluding remarks
The narrow focus on CO 2 in most economic analyses of the Kyoto Protocol captures the effects of abatement of the single-most important greenhouse gas. Our analysis shows, however, that policy makers may reduce costs significantly by exploiting the multi-gas flexibility in the Protocol. Specifically, the multi-gas flexibility implies more low costs abatement options and reductions in the abatement requirements. These effects may also increase domestic action, which together with costs, are some of the key issues in the policy debate.
We emphasize the preliminary nature of our results as many issues related to sinks and non-CO 2 abatement warrants more work. First, we only have studies of the marginal abatement costs of the non-CO 2 emissions in the European Union and the United States, and together these countries account for more than 50% of total Annex B emissions of non-CO 2 . For the other Annex B regions, we use the marginal abatement cost curves for the European Union, but it would be useful to get estimates for these regions, particularly Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, which together accounts for around 30% of total Annex B emissions.
Second, we developed our own baseline for non-CO 2 emissions based on the Annex B countries' communications to the UNFCCC. It is generally hard to identify consistent and relevant baselines in these data, so more and better emissions data could substantially improve the analysis.
Finally, additional sinks projects could be incorporated through a sector, which uses scarce land resources and receives emissions credit depending on the characteristics of the activities it undertakes (for example conversion of agricultural land to forests). Sales of the credits from this sector would then add to the regular sales revenues and thus provide an incentive to use the technologies with the highest potential for emissions removal. This approach would also capture the effects of changes in land rents and in product prices, but again, more analyses are needed, as we know little about the costs and benefits of additional sinks projects.
Appendix: Database for sinks and non-CO 2 gases
Our model analysis requires data for historic and projected emissions of the six greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto protocol. For CO 2 , we combine consistent base year energy data from the International Energy Agency and carbon emissions coefficients to calculate historic CO 2 emissions. We derive projected CO 2 emissions based on model calculations reported in European Commission [1999] .
Similar information is not available for sinks and non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions.
We have therefore compiled a database with baseline sinks and non-CO 2 emissions based on the Annex B countries' communications to the UNFCCC. 12 The data sources include UNFCCC [1998] , UNFCCC [2000] , and World Bank [2000] . 13 Neither the data for historic nor projected emissions are complete. For historic emissions, we therefore make two assumptions: First, if only data for 1990 or 1995 is available, emissions in the two years are identical. Second, if no data for a given country is available, emissions equal GDP times the ratio of emissions to GDP in the EDGE region where the country belongs. Finally, we recalculate the emissions indices for the model regions based on the complete set of emissions projections. 12 Note that the communications are not necessarily mutually consistent and in some cases, they furthermore include the anticipated effects of proposed policies. This makes it hard to identify a relevant baseline, i.e., the expected future emissions with no changes in current policies. 13 Very little data are available from the UNFCCC on developing countries (see http://ghg.unfccc.int). Alternative data sources include ALGAS and UNEP studies.
